President Trump’s rare earth diplomacy could reshape U.S. influence in Asia, forging new partnerships with Myanmar’s pro-democracy forces while reducing China’s control over critical minerals. Photo illustration by Antonio Graceffo. Created with AI.
President Trump has made rare earth diplomacy a key element of his foreign policy, securing major supply chain and mining agreements across allied nations to counter China’s control of 90% of global processing capacity. In 2025, the United States signed multibillion-dollar agreements with Australia, Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand to expand exploration, refining, and export of critical minerals, while ensuring these partners refrain from export restrictions that could harm U.S. industries.
These deals mark a strategic shift, tying trade, security, and industrial policy together to reduce dependency on Beijing’s supply chains and strengthen U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Trump applied the same model in Ukraine, framing postwar reconstruction as a joint economic and security partnership. The April 30, 2025 U.S.–Ukraine Rare Earth and Resource Agreement created a joint investment fund giving Washington preferential rights to Ukraine’s rare earths, gold, copper, and energy resources in exchange for continued U.S. defense and reconstruction support.
Ukraine holds an estimated 5% of the world’s rare earth reserves, and the agreement ensures those resources remain under Western rather than Chinese control. The deal reflects Trump’s doctrine of linking American security guarantees to long-term economic partnerships, a model that could similarly stabilize Burma through resource-based diplomacy.
A rare-earth deal similar to the one President Trump negotiated with Zelensky in Ukraine could help end the war in Burma (Myanmar). The conflict began in 1948 and has become a full-blown civil war since the 2021 military coup. If the U.S. were to make a direct agreement with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the group that controls the bulk of rare-earth mines currently in operation, it would cut off a major source of revenue to the junta and redirect funds to the pro-democracy resistance.
China has backed the military economically and with weapons. Rerouting Burma’s rare-earth exports toward the United States would both slow Chinese economic leverage and sever a vital lifeline for the junta, helping to level the playing field so the resistance has a real chance to prevail.
Burma is the world’s fourth-largest producer of rare earth minerals, responsible for about 9 percent of global output, roughly 44,000 metric tons in 2024. Production surged after the 2021 coup, showing how quickly the country can expand extraction when demand rises. Most of Burma’s rare earth deposits are found in Kachin and Shan States and are rich in heavy rare earths, the most valuable and strategically important type. These deposits are among the few remaining outside China, making them irreplaceable to the global supply chain.
China depends heavily on Burma for these minerals, importing around 70 percent of its medium- to heavy-rare-earth feedstock from the country. Since 2021, Burma’s exports to China have totaled roughly $3.6 billion, forming the junta’s main source of hard currency.
When the Kachin Independence Army seized major rare-earth mining centers in October 2024, Beijing immediately shut its border crossings with northern Burma, causing dysprosium prices to surge 32 percent within weeks.
The spike exposed China’s heavy dependence on Burmese rare earths and highlighted how deeply the conflict is tied to China’s economic interests. Fearing instability around its Belt and Road investments, Beijing has since pushed several armed groups to negotiate ceasefires with the junta in an attempt to secure its trade routes and resource corridors.
Under Chinese pressure, members of the Three Brotherhood Alliance have been drawn into peace talks. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) signed a ceasefire in January 2025 after a series of meetings in Kunming. China enforced the deal by sealing border crossings, cutting fuel and internet supplies, and even detaining MNDAA commander Peng Daxun when he entered Yunnan for negotiations.
The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) followed in October 2025, agreeing to withdraw from towns it had captured in exchange for a temporary halt to junta airstrikes. China again closed the border and restricted the flow of vital goods, starving rebel-held regions of supplies and forcing compliance.
In addition to forcing resistance armies into ceasefires, China has pressured allied ethnic groups to stop selling weapons and ammunition to pro-democracy forces. On August 20, 2025, the United Wa State Party (UWSP), the political wing of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), announced it would halt all support to its longtime allies, including the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP). UWSP Vice Chair Zhao Guoan declared that the organization would no longer supply weapons, equipment, or funding, nor allow military passage through its territory.
The move came after Beijing accused the UWSA of violating its “no war and no unrest” policy in northern Burma by enabling Operation 1027 and other anti-junta offensives. China responded with punitive actions, freezing UWSA assets, sealing border crossings, and detaining individuals connected to arms transfers. Zhao publicly warned that Beijing would escalate sanctions if the group continued arming other forces.
The UWSA had long been the primary weapons supplier for resistance movements, providing funding, safe territory, and logistical routes since the 2021 coup. Under Chinese pressure, this supply chain has now been severed, dramatically raising arms prices and reducing access for ethnic Burman resistance groups that relied heavily on UWSA stockpiles.
Analysts believe this marks a turning point in Beijing’s strategy: once content to hedge its bets, China is now clearly backing the junta and using the UWSA as leverage to weaken the democratic resistance.
These developments further demonstrate Beijing’s growing control over Burma’s war and its readiness to sacrifice democratic reform to protect its resource interests and border stability. A democratic Burma aligned with Western markets could reverse this balance, cutting China’s access to more than half its supply of heavy rare earths and stripping the junta of one of its last remaining lifelines.
By making a rare-earth deal directly with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the popular pro-democracy authority in Kachin State, President Trump would take a significant step toward ending the war without committing U.S. troops or large sums of money.
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