China has been supporting Iran’s drone, missile, and nuclear programs, directly or indirectly, for years. Severing that relationship will help neutralize the threat emerging from Iran. Illustration created by Gemini from user prompts.
China and Iran maintain a security relationship that, while stopping short of a formal defense alliance, has expanded from conventional weapons sales into dual-use technology transfers, joint military exercises, and satellite navigation access. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, in its March 2026 fact sheet on the China-Iran relationship, assessed that Beijing has avoided formal defense commitments to Tehran while continuing to provide support that benefits Iran’s military capabilities.
China was a major conventional weapons supplier to Iran during the 1980s but largely ceased direct transfers in 2015 following UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which increased international scrutiny of such transactions. Security cooperation since then has shifted toward dual-use technology transfers relevant to Iran’s missile and drone programs. Chinese components, including sensors, voltage converters, and semiconductors, have been identified in Iranian drones used both by Iran’s regional proxies and by Russia in Ukraine.
In the days before U.S. and Israeli strikes began in late February 2026, anonymously sourced reports indicated China had sold attack drones to Iran and was close to finalizing a deal for supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, though no delivery date had been agreed upon. If confirmed, this would represent a shift toward providing Iran with offensive kinetic capabilities beyond dual-use components.
Reports also indicate that China allowed Iranian state-owned vessels to load sodium perchlorate, a key precursor used in solid rocket fuel for ballistic missiles, at China’s Gaolan Port. During the week of March 2, 2026, two Iranian ships departed the port carrying the chemical. A similar incident occurred in January 2025, when two Iranian vessels loaded approximately 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate at Chinese ports.
In 2021, China granted Iran full military access to its BeiDou satellite navigation system. Whether Iran’s military is currently using BeiDou to guide drone and missile attacks has not been definitively established from open-source evidence, though Al Jazeera cited experts who believe this to be the case.
Direct bilateral military engagement between the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Iran has been limited, with the last bilateral meeting recorded in 2022. Cooperation has instead occurred through trilateral and multilateral formats, including an annual joint naval exercise with Russia that began in 2019. Iran hosted a Shanghai Cooperation Organization military exercise that included China in December 2025. In January 2026, Iran was set to participate in a China-led naval exercise with BRICS nations near South Africa but withdrew after South Africa requested its removal.
China’s response to the U.S. and Israeli strikes has been confined to diplomatic statements. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared the strikes violations of international law, condemned the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and called for an immediate ceasefire and resumption of dialogue. Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in a call with his Iranian counterpart, reaffirmed Chinese support for Iran’s sovereignty while expressing confidence that Iran would take into account the concerns of its neighbors. China has not explicitly endorsed Iran’s attacks on Gulf states but condemned what it called indiscriminate attacks on civilians and non-military targets.
On the energy side, China relies on seaborne imports for over 63 percent of its oil needs, with half of those imports flowing through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran accounts for roughly 22 percent of China’s combined oil imports from Iran, Russia, and Venezuela. In the period leading up to U.S. military action, the volume of Iranian and Venezuelan oil aboard tankers anchored in China’s coastal waters increased, with approximately 40 million barrels held in floating storage as a buffer against a prolonged Strait closure.
On March 12, 2026, Chinese authorities halted exports of refined oil products that had not yet cleared customs, signaling concern about supply disruptions. As of March 10, some ships transiting the Strait were reportedly claiming Chinese crews in an effort to deter Iranian attacks, while Iran’s oil exports had not decreased, with most transiting vessels belonging to the shadow fleet.
The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, estimates that China holds strategic reserves estimated to sustain its core needs for two to four years under aggressive rationing combined with increased use of overland pipelines, if seaborne imports were cut off entirely.
China is the primary enabler of Iran’s missile, drone, and nuclear-adjacent programs. Without Chinese components, Chinese rocket fuel precursors, Chinese satellite navigation, and Chinese sanctions-evasion networks, Iran’s ability to threaten its neighbors, attack commercial shipping, and hold the Strait of Hormuz hostage would be substantially degraded.
Severing that relationship would do more to defang Iran than any single military strike. As long as China continues to purchase Iranian oil, transfer dual-use technology, and provide diplomatic cover at the UN, Iran retains the resources and capability to reconstitute its programs and resume its regional aggression.
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