The media would have one believe that the United States is losing in Iran. However, President Trump has managed to achieve a number of crucial foreign-policy objectives.
The media is claiming that President Trump is losing the war and mishandling the conflict with Iran. However, this framing overlooks several strategic gains that align with longstanding U.S. objectives in the region.
U.S. and Israeli forces launched nearly 900 strikes in 12 hours on February 28, 2026, targeting Iranian missiles, air defenses, military infrastructure, and leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
U.S. officials assessed that all three targeted nuclear sites, Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, sustained severe damage, with Natanz destroyed and Iran’s nuclear program set back by roughly two years.
The IAEA also confirmed that the sites suffered extensive damage, however a leaked DIA report also found that much of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile may have been moved before the strikes.
Iran’s capacity for conventional retaliation has been materially degraded. The first phase of the U.S.-Israeli campaign suppressed air defenses, decapitated command and control, and rendered over 300 ballistic missile launchers inoperable.
Iran did retaliate: Tehran launched an unprecedented barrage of missiles and drones at all six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, targeting U.S. military installations, energy infrastructure, civilian airports, and commercial districts. Those strikes were largely intercepted or limited in effect.
Though the conflict ultimately killed 13 Americans and wounded 381, the cost to Iran was categorically higher. The opening strikes decapitated military command in a single operation, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, IRGC Commander-in-Chief Mohammad Pakpour, Chief of the General Staff Abdolrahim Mousavi, Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, and Defense Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani. In subsequent weeks, strikes killed Larijani, Soleimani, Khatib, respectively the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, the Basij militia commander, and the Intelligence Minister, along with 10 nuclear scientists.
Iran’s navy was systematically destroyed: by day 12, CENTCOM confirmed more than 60 ships struck, including the entire Soleimani-class warship fleet. By March 6, over 30 ships had been sunk, Iranian ballistic missile attacks had fallen 90% from day one, and drone attacks 83%. In total, the U.S. struck more than 5,500 targets inside Iran across the campaign.
Iran’s regional proxy network, already weakened before the current conflict began, has deteriorated further. Israeli operations after October 7, 2023, exposed Iran’s vulnerabilities by dismantling the proxy network that served as Tehran’s primary deterrent against a direct Israeli strike.
The Belfer Center documented the cumulative effect: Iran’s funding of Hezbollah was further constrained in early 2026, and internal fractures deepened among Iran-backed militias in Iraq, with some factions accepting disarmament demands and others refusing, splits that U.S. pressure had deliberately widened.
On the economic front, sanctions enforcement has tightened significantly. Iran’s oil exports declined sharply at the start of 2026, with 86% of tankers carrying Iranian crude already under U.S. sanctions, forcing Iran to sell at discounts of $11 to $12 per barrel below comparable benchmarks.
The U.S. naval blockade imposed on April 13 drove exports to near zero. By May, Iran’s seaborne crude exports had fallen to just 3% of the February baseline, with crude exports reportedly reaching zero and estimated export revenues dropping below $200 million for the month.
With storage capacity exhausted, Iran reportedly began dumping oil into the Persian Gulf, creating oil slicks that spread toward the coastlines of neighboring countries, including Kuwait.
Tehran rejected the reports and attributed the slicks to ballast water from European tankers. Kpler data showed approximately 147 million barrels of Iranian crude stranded in floating storage, including 67 million barrels trapped inside the Gulf and unable to move past the U.S. blockade line.
The State Department issued successive rounds of sanctions targeting Iran’s energy-smuggling networks, shadow fleet, digital-asset exchanges, and Iran-China oil trade through May and June 2026.
The IMF projects Iran’s economy will shrink 6.1% in 2026, with inflation at 68.9% and the rial collapsing to 1.32 million per U.S. dollar. By May, year-on-year inflation had reached levels not recorded since World War II.
The broader geopolitical realignment is where some of the most consequential, and least reported, shifts have occurred.
The Turnberry Agreement, signed in July 2025 at Trump’s Scottish resort, committed the EU to purchasing $750 billion in U.S. energy, LNG, oil, and nuclear technology, to replace Russian supplies, with EU member states also committing to U.S. military equipment purchases.
The Hormuz crisis accelerated European ratification pressure. EU lawmakers approved the deal in March 2026, after previously calling it unbalanced, as Middle Eastern energy supplies proved vulnerable to disruption and European dependence on U.S. LNG reached 58% of imports and is expected to rise in 2026.
The Venezuela realignment is the clearest and most underreported strategic gain. Following the removal of Nicolás Maduro in January 2026, the U.S. conditioned production authorization on Venezuela severing economic ties with China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba and partnering exclusively with the United States.
OFAC granted operating licenses to BP, Chevron, Eni, Repsol, and Shell, with royalty payments directed to U.S. Treasury-designated accounts and participation by China, Iran, and Russia explicitly barred. The EIA projected Venezuelan crude output could increase by up to 20% from a base of nearly 1 million barrels per day.
On China, Secretary of State Rubio reported after the Trump-Xi summit that China stated it was not in favor of militarizing the Strait of Hormuz, opposed a tolling system, and reiterated opposition to Iran developing nuclear weapons.
Against that, China’s conduct at the UN diverged sharply: Beijing and Moscow vetoed a resolution calling for an end to Iranian attacks on shipping. Treasury Secretary Bessent publicly stated that China was “funding” Iran and urged Beijing.
As of June 7, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed, with approximately 10 vessel transits per day against a pre-crisis norm of roughly 95, and Brent crude trading at $98.29 per barrel.
A conditional ceasefire is in place, extended pending the conclusion of negotiations, but the U.S. counter-blockade on Iranian ports remains active.
The available evidence supports the conclusion that the United States has achieved several measurable strategic outcomes. Iran’s nuclear facilities have been damaged, with Pentagon assessments indicating a roughly two-year delay to its nuclear program.
Its conventional missile force has been reduced, its proxy network is at its weakest point in decades, and its oil revenues have declined while the broader economy remains under sustained pressure.
Beyond Iran, Venezuelan oil exports have been redirected under U.S. licensing requirements, and Europe has committed to purchasing $750 billion in U.S. energy through an agreement accelerated by the Hormuz crisis.
Several questions remain unresolved, including the durability of the nuclear setback, whether the United States can force a full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and whether a future government in Tehran would be more or less inclined to pursue a nuclear weapon.
Those are legitimate subjects for debate. However, reporting that focuses exclusively on those uncertainties while omitting the documented strategic gains presents a selective and therefore misleading picture.
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