Iran’s ruling clerics believe the ayatollah serves as the earthly deputy of the Hidden Imam, tasked with preparing the world for the return of the messianic figure of prophecy, Muhammad al-Mahdi, through the expansion of an Islamic state. In this framework, political power and conflict are religious obligations tied to triggering an apocalyptic end-times event.
Western policymakers and political pundits mistakenly interpret Iran’s relationships with the rest of the globe, particularly the United States and Israel, as well as with the broader Islamic world, through the lens of the Shia–Sunni divide. However, the reality of Iran’s theocracy is far more complex and far more sinister than that.
The Islamic Republic’s ruling theology is not mainstream Twelver Shia Islam. Twelver Shia Islam, followed by roughly 85 percent of Shia Muslims worldwide and recognized as Iran’s official state religion, has been transformed into a controversial fusion of apocalypticism, political mysticism, and quasi-divine claims of authority that orthodox Shia scholars have explicitly rejected.
The centerpiece of that transformation is the regime’s radicalized interpretation of Mahdism, a concept that exists within mainstream Twelver Shia theology but has been radicalized and repurposed by Iran’s ruling clerics into something the traditional Shia scholarly world does not recognize.
Mahdism holds that the Twelfth Divinely ordained Shia Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, was withdrawn into a miraculous state of concealment by God in 874 CE to protect him from the Sunni Abbasid Caliphate, which had killed his father. Shia Muslims believe he will one day return to defeat evil in a final apocalyptic battle.
For centuries, mainstream Shia clerical doctrine held that any government during this period of occultation was illegitimate, that clergy should confine themselves to spiritual matters, and that believers should wait passively for the Mahdi’s return.
In 1979, Ruhollah Khomeini led the revolution that overthrew Iran’s U.S.-backed Shah, took 52 Americans hostage for 444 days, and established the Islamic Republic, which has remained in direct confrontation with the United States ever since.
Khomeini also broke sharply with traditional Shia doctrine. During his years in exile, he developed the theory of velayat-e faqih, arguing that rather than waiting passively for the return of the Imam, Shia Muslims were obligated to prepare the conditions for his arrival. This required political action, the creation of an Islamic state, and the elevation of a supreme clerical authority to act as the Imam’s deputy on earth. Iran’s 1979 constitution codified this framework, presenting the revolution as the first stage in a process leading to the Mahdi’s return.
This doctrine was widely opposed by the Shia establishment, particularly Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, who viewed it as unjust and tyrannical.
The unorthodoxy ran deeper than politics. Scholar Vali Nasr concluded that Khomeini’s authority rested not on Shia history or theology but on mystical doctrines, that “his was a new Shiism.” Khomeini incorporated Neo-Platonist Greek thought into his governance theory, envisioning the ideal leader as a “perfect man” possessing the divine essence, stating: “Anyone who has the quality of a perfect man, that is the quality of the divine essence, is a caliph in this world.”
It has been claimed that Khomeini believed he himself had achieved mystical union with God, a position with no basis in orthodox Islamic theology of any school. Prominent Shia cleric Sadiq Shirazi accused Khomeini of elevating himself to divinity, asking publicly: “Did he not say that the powers of the guardian jurist are the same as those of God?” Shirazi was subsequently arrested.
One of velayat-e faqih’s most radical extensions was Khomeini’s 1988 assertion that the Islamic state holds the religious mandate to suspend, or revoke, divine ordinances including hajj and fasting if it deems necessary, placing state authority above Quranic commandments with no precedent in Islamic jurisprudence.
The unorthodoxy extended to the credentials of the most recent Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, who was killed by a joint U.S.-Israeli bombing on February 28, 2026. He was a middle-ranking cleric at his ascension, not yet called an ayatollah, let alone a grand ayatollah. He subsequently used state media, patronage networks, and the security apparatus to install himself as a grand ayatollah and pressured senior clerics to recognize his rank. His religious authority was coerced, not earned.
Khamenei nonetheless developed the Mahdist doctrine further after assuming leadership in 1989, outlining five revolutionary stages required before the Mahdi’s return: an Islamic Revolution, an Islamic regime, an Islamic government, an Islamic society, and an Islamic civilization. By his own assessment, Iran had completed only the first two. This means the regime believes it is executing a divinely mandated sequence of steps whose endpoint is a cosmic event, the return of the Hidden Imam and the apocalyptic defeat of evil.
The United States and Israel are not merely political adversaries in this framework. They are obstacles on that checklist, whose removal is a religious requirement for completing the sequence. It is essentially a self-assigned prophecy fulfillment program, with Khamenei casting himself and the Islamic Republic as the agents responsible for bringing about the end times on God’s behalf.
The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 accelerated the radicalization. Ahmadinejad declared that Iran’s mission was “to turn Iran into the country of the Hidden Imam” and directed $17 million in state funds to the Jamkaran Mosque, where some Shia have long believed the Mahdi will reappear. That belief is now a central feature of the regime’s theocracy.
Ahmadinejad also spent an additional $8 million on pilgrim hospitality for the Mahdi’s birthday. He constructed a highway linking the mosque directly to Tehran’s international airport so the Imam, upon his return, would not be delayed by traffic. His administration also empowered maddahs, non-clerical ideological preachers with no formal religious training who are fixated on Mahdism, who had already been used during the Iran-Iraq War to incite human-wave martyrdom attacks.
After the 2009 protests, the IRGC institutionalized this network through the Basij Maddahs Organization to monopolize Mahdist religious culture across Iran. The radicalization reached the point where followers openly proclaimed that Ahmadinejad and Khamenei were the prophesied forerunners named in Shia narrations as figures appearing immediately before the Mahdi’s return.
Iran’s 1979 constitution establishes the IRGC explicitly as an “ideological army” mandated with “extending sovereignty of God’s law throughout the world.” Unlike the regular Iranian army, whose mission is border defense, the IRGC exists to protect the Shia clergy and export the Islamic Revolution.
Ideological indoctrination has been central since the IRGC’s founding, but escalated sharply after reports that 73 percent of IRGC members had voted for reformist Khatami in 1997. Khamenei responded by expanding indoctrination from 20 percent of overall training in 2002, to 30 percent by 2007, to roughly 50 percent after the 2009 protests. Promotion within the IRGC rewards ideological commitment over technical expertise.
The result is that the IRGC’s third and fourth generations are the most radical in its history, demonstrated by the surge of volunteers for Shia jihadist operations in Syria, and by the November 2019 killing of an estimated 1,500 civilian protesters in a matter of days, compared to roughly 100 killed over an entire month during the 2009 Green Movement protests.
The IRGC rejects the nation-state as a Western construct, dividing the world into the dar al-Islam and the dar al-Kufr. Antisemitism pervades every dimension of its doctrine, and the destruction of Israel is a core ideological pillar. That goal is now framed in explicitly Mahdist terms: the Middle East Forum reports that the IRGC views Israel’s existence as the “greatest barrier” to the Imam’s reappearance, making its eradication a religious prerequisite rather than a strategic objective.
The Middle East Institute documents that the Masaf Institute, whose full name translates as “The Struggle Against Zionism, Humanism and the Freemasons,” promotes Mahdism as preparation for the End of Days and receives direct IRGC financial support.
The IRGC’s hostility toward the United States and its drive to destroy Israel are understood internally as religious obligations, prerequisites for triggering the Mahdi’s return.
Taken together, this quasi-religious political belief system suggests the IRGC would not easily stand down or surrender, regardless of how much damage is inflicted or how many lives are lost in pursuit of triggering the Mahdi’s return.
At the same time, the man now nominally leading that mission lacks the legitimacy of his predecessor. MEMRI reports that the nation’s new leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the late Ayatollah, is an apocalyptic ideologue closely affiliated with IRGC intelligence and is positioning the regime as the “beating heart” of a religious empire aimed at making Shia Islam the sole prevailing political and religious current in the Muslim world.
His ascension, however, was engineered rather than earned. The IRGC forced through his selection, overcoming opposition from pragmatists and senior clerical figures, whose objections delayed the announcement by hours.
The Middle East Institute’s Alex Vatanka concluded that Mojtaba “owes his position to the Revolutionary Guards and as such he is not going to be as supreme as his father was.” Ali Khamenei’s own written will, presented during the selection process, stated that he did not wish his son or any family member to succeed him. Some analysts have described the appointment as Iran reverting to hereditary rule after abandoning it in 1979.
Within the IRGC, Mojtaba is described by former associates as “apocalypse-obsessed,” with some of his supporters believing he is the prophesied Khorasani, a messianic figure from Shia eschatology destined to pave the way for the Mahdi’s return.
Whether he is in any condition to fulfill that role remains an open question. Wounded in the same strike that killed his father, Mojtaba has not appeared on camera, in a photograph, or in person at any public event since his appointment on March 8, including his own father’s memorial.
His statements have been read aloud by television anchors, not delivered by the man himself. State media have insisted he survived the strike, but conflicting reports about his condition have not been resolved.
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