Russian servicemen line up beside Yars intercontinental ballistic missile systems of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces in Teikovo, Ivanovo Region, western Russia. Photo courtesy of PressTV Iran.
The two major ongoing military conflicts, between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, and the Russia–Ukraine war, both involve nuclear-armed powers.
This raises the question of what level of escalation would be required to push the world toward nuclear war.
The nine nuclear-armed states are the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Iran is not yet a nuclear-armed state but is widely regarded as a nuclear threshold state, possessing enough enriched uranium for multiple weapons and the delivery systems to deploy them, pending only the weaponization step.
The nine nuclear-armed countries possessed roughly 12,187 warheads as of the beginning of 2026. The overall inventory continues to decline due to U.S. and Russian dismantlement of retired warheads, but the pace of reductions is slowing and is likely to be outpaced by new warhead production in the coming years.
The crucial elements of a nuclear posture review include the number and types of weapons each country possesses and what their nuclear threshold is, meaning, do they have a no-first-use rule and if not what level of provocation would be necessary to trigger a nuclear response.
With the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in February 2026, we are now operating in an era of potentially unconstrained nuclear buildup between the two largest nuclear powers, as both the United States and Russia have discussed resuming nuclear testing.
Across the globe, the convergence of multiple modernizing arsenals, the collapse of arms control architecture, and the first-use doctrines across several states represents the most complex nuclear environment since the Cold War.
UNITED STATES – The United States maintains a stockpile of approximately 3,700 warheads and has embarked on an ambitious plan to overhaul its nuclear weapons arsenal and command and control systems.
The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States or its allies and partners, with secondary roles including deterring strategic attack, assuring allies, and enabling achievement of national objectives in extreme circumstances if deterrence fails.
The U.S. retains a first-use option: declaratory policy allows for the first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear threats under “extreme” circumstances, and maintains a launch-under-attack posture.
In October 2025, Trump made statements indicating a desire to resume nuclear testing, followed by affirmation from Secretary of War Pete Hegseth.
RUSSIA – Combined, the United States and Russia possess approximately 86 percent of the world’s total inventory of nuclear weapons.
A 2025 DIA assessment stated that Russia has a stockpile of about 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, with the majority deployed on ICBMs commanded by a separate military service, the Strategic Rocket Forces. Russia’s doctrine underwent a significant shift in late 2024.
On November 19, 2024, Putin signed a decree updating formal policy on the possible use of nuclear weapons, outlining a wider range of contingencies that might trigger nuclear use and appearing to lower the threshold.
The 2024 document states Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to aggression “which creates a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity,” replacing the older condition of “when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”
The 2024 doctrine also introduced language allowing nuclear escalation in response to a “massive launch of air and space attack means” crossing Russia’s border, essentially codifying a response to modern conventional warfare.
CHINA – From 2015–2025, China more than doubled its nuclear arsenal from 260 warheads to an estimated 600. The Pentagon projects over 1,000 operational warheads by 2030. China officially maintains a No First Use policy, reaffirmed in its November 2025 Arms Control White Paper.
However, the Pentagon assesses Beijing “probably would consider nuclear first use if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan gravely threatened regime survival.”
China’s September 2025 Victory Day parade marked the first time it publicly displayed all three legs of its nuclear triad together, including the JL-3 SLBM, DF-5C ICBM, and new DF-61 ICBM.
UNITED KINGDOM – The UK maintains deliberate ambiguity on nuclear first use, explicitly reserving the option to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack.
This position was confirmed by the government in the House of Lords in January 2026. Nuclear use is limited to extreme circumstances of self-defense, including the defense of NATO allies.
The UK also states that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT.
As of January 2022, the UK holds a stockpile of 225 warheads, with an estimated 120 operationally available for deployment.
These are carried on 48 submarine-launched ballistic missiles aboard four Vanguard-class Trident submarines, forming an exclusively sea-based deterrent.
The stockpile ceiling is set to rise to no more than 260 warheads under plans confirmed in the 2023 Integrated Review.
In June 2025, the UK announced it would expand its contribution to NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission by purchasing 12 F-35A dual-capable aircraft.
These aircraft are capable of deploying U.S. nuclear weapons in a crisis. Upgraded U.S. nuclear gravity bombs, confirmed by Washington in early 2025, were also returned to RAF Lakenheath for the first time since 2008.
FRANCE – France retains a first-use policy, never having renounced the option despite maintaining a posture of “strict sufficiency,” keeping its arsenal at the lowest level compatible with the strategic context.
Nuclear use is limited to extreme circumstances where “vital interests” are threatened, a threshold deliberately left vague and defined solely at the discretion of the president, but understood to encompass territorial integrity, population protection, and sovereignty.
French doctrine historically includes a “final warning” concept: a single demonstrative nuclear strike intended to signal resolve and halt conventional aggression before escalating to full strategic exchange, an explicitly first-use construct.
At least one of four nuclear submarines remains on patrol at sea at all times, providing a survivable second-strike capability that does not preclude first use.
As of July 2025, France maintains 290 operational warheads deployable across 98 delivery systems, comprising 48 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 50 air-launched cruise missiles for land and carrier-based aircraft.
France controls its deterrent independently outside NATO’s integrated command structure, and in March 2026 announced plans for an undisclosed stockpile increase while simultaneously reversing its longstanding practice of arsenal transparency.
Paris has been debating whether to extend its deterrent to cover European allies amid reduced U.S. commitments to the continent.
INDIA – India is estimated to possess up to 172 nuclear warheads. India’s doctrine pledges no first use but promises that nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be “massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”
As an exception to no-first-use, India will use nuclear weapons against any state that targets the country or its military forces with biological or chemical weapons.
India has developed a robust nuclear triad, with Arihant-class nuclear submarines providing a sea-based second-strike capability. India continues to invest in modernization, developing MIRV capabilities and commissioning its second nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine.
India’s NFU commitment has faced internal pressure: various statements by officials, including former defense ministers and national security advisers, have suggested the no-first-use policy could be reconsidered in light of emerging threats such as hypersonic missiles.
The 2025 India-Pakistan conflict tested but did not break India’s posture. India ignored Pakistani nuclear signaling during the four-day conflict in May, with Prime Minister Modi describing conventional military strikes as a “new normal.”
PAKISTAN – Pakistan’s arsenal is estimated at 170 nuclear warheads as of 2025, with the DIA’s 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment noting Pakistan has not adopted a no-first-use policy and is expanding its arsenal, with projections suggesting a potential increase to 200.
Pakistan pursues full-spectrum deterrence, with four broad triggers that could result in nuclear use: large territorial loss, destruction of a significant portion of air or land forces, economic strangulation, or political destabilization. Pakistan has since 2011 developed tactical nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use, and in 2015 confirmed these could be used in a potential conflict with India.
Pakistan’s deterrence logic was undermined during the May 2025 conflict when India conducted conventional strikes despite Pakistani nuclear signaling.
Following the ceasefire, Pakistan’s Army Chief issued a nuclear threat from U.S. soil, warning Pakistan would “take half the world down” if faced with an existential threat.
NORTH KOREA – As of early 2026, the Federation of American Scientists and SIPRI assess approximately 50 assembled warheads, with fissile material sufficient for up to 90, and a claimed production capacity of 6–7 new warheads annually.
A September 2023 law expanded the conditions under which Pyongyang would employ nuclear weapons, lowering what had been a high threshold for use.
The 2022 Nuclear Force Policy Law allows “immediate and automatic” retaliation if leadership or strategic assets are threatened, and Kim’s five-year defense plan targets annual warhead production increases, diversification across land, sea, and air platforms, and integration of tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use against South Korean forces.
At a Workers’ Party congress, Kim Jong Un stated the DPRK’s position as a nuclear weapons state “has been consolidated to be irreversible and permanent,” with analysts noting the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran will likely reinforce Kim’s determination not to bargain away the regime’s nuclear capability.
North Korea has explicitly rejected denuclearization and is pursuing MIRVs, hypersonic glide vehicles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
ISRAEL – Israel is estimated to have 90 nuclear warheads, with fissile material stockpiles sufficient for approximately 200 weapons.
Israel does not admit nor deny having nuclear weapons, and states that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East, though it is universally believed to possess nuclear arms stored in a partially disassembled state.
In 2024, Israel conducted a test of a missile propulsion system potentially related to its Jericho family of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and appears to be upgrading its plutonium production reactor at Dimona.
Israel’s policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity has come under pressure following the 2025 conflict with Iran.
Analysts argue Israel will need to update its strategic posture by shifting from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure,” particularly given that a defanged Iran could call upon nuclear-armed North Korea as a proxy. Israel has no declared doctrine, no-first-use pledge, or participation in the NPT.
Iran – While Iran has yet to produce nuclear weapons, it possesses the largest ballistic missile inventory in the Middle East and has an extensive record of direct state-on-state missile use. Its longest-range systems can reach up to 2,000 kilometers, placing the entire Middle East within range.
Iran has a documented record of threatening and attacking neighboring states with ballistic missiles and drones, directing its Houthi proxies to paralyze Red Sea shipping for over a year beginning in late 2023, and closing the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 through IRGC naval attacks on merchant vessels, disruptions that together struck at two of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints and triggered the largest oil supply shock since the 1970s.
A nuclear capability would deter the military strikes that have been the primary check on Iran’s behavior, freeing Tehran to escalate proxy warfare, missile attacks, and strategic chokepoint coercion against its neighbors and global shipping lanes without fear of the conventional retaliation that has, until now, constrained it.
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