On April 20, 2026, China deployed the aircraft carrier Liaoning through the Taiwan Strait into the South China Sea, while simultaneously dispatching a naval task group through the Yokoate Channel into the Western Pacific. Photo courtesy of China Military via People’s Daily.
On April 17, the Japanese destroyer JS Ikazuchi transited the Taiwan Strait, the fourth such transit by a Japanese warship since September 2024, and the first since Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae took office.
The date compounded Beijing’s reaction. April 17 is the anniversary of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, under which Japan forced China to cede Taiwan, and the PLA Daily accused Tokyo of “harming the feelings of the Chinese people” by choosing that date. Beijing, which claims the strait is Chinese internal waters rather than an international waterway, responded with a coordinated two-pronged naval operation that analysts say goes well beyond a reaction to a single provocation.
The transit also signaled Japan’s alignment with Washington’s freedom of navigation posture. China’s Foreign Ministry called the passage a “dangerous plot” to militarily intervene in the Taiwan Strait, and spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated at a press briefing that the Taiwan issue is a non-negotiable “red line.”
The United States is Taiwan’s primary security guarantor, and Japan has become an increasingly aligned partner, but Washington’s insistence on free passage through the strait is not solely about Taiwan. It reflects a broader principle: that freedom of navigation is a pre-existing customary right of all nations, one that UNCLOS codified but did not create, which the US enforces through its Freedom of Navigation Operations program.
No other nation runs a comparable program, deploys carrier strike groups globally to assert transit rights, or challenges excessive maritime claims at anything approaching the same scale. The legal weight behind Washington’s position is considerable: under UNCLOS Article 58, even within a coastal state’s exclusive economic zone, freedom of navigation cannot be restricted, meaning China has no lawful basis to block transit through the corridor of water lying outside its 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.
The economic stakes underscore the importance of keeping the strait free of China’s control. Roughly 44 percent of the world’s container fleet transits the strait annually, along with 88 percent of the largest ships by tonnage. Over 95 percent of Japan’s crude oil and 65 percent of South Korea’s crude oil arrive from Middle Eastern suppliers, whose tankers follow the most direct route through the Taiwan Strait.
Were China to capture Taiwan, it would control both shores of the strait, making any claim to regulate transit far more practically enforceable, even if it remained illegal under international law. Beijing has long signaled its intention to assert jurisdiction over the waterway, and physical control of both coastlines would move that ambition operational.
Beijing’s response to Japan’s transits was larger and more pointed than usual. The PLA Eastern Theater Command dispatched the 133rd naval task group through the Yokoate Channel, a waterway through the Ryukyu Islands near the Japanese mainland, into the Western Pacific.
In a separate move, the aircraft carrier Liaoning transited the Taiwan Strait on April 20 and headed south toward the South China Sea. The Eastern Theater Command described both movements as “routine training activity organized in accordance with the annual plan” and “not aimed at any specific country or target,” but the composition and timing of the forces suggest otherwise.
Since the main theater of the ongoing US-Philippines Balikatan exercise is centered on northern Luzon, concurrent PLAN operations by the 133rd task group in the Philippine Sea and the Liaoning in the South China Sea constitute what analysts describe as a tactical envelopment rehearsal targeting forces operating near Luzon, with China practicing pressure on US and allied forces from two directions at once.
The deployment also comes after Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s meeting with U.S. leadership, and analysts assess it as designed to signal resolve to Tokyo while shaping the military balance ahead of high-level diplomacy with Washington.
The most recent publicly verified Liaoning strike group composition, from its December 2022 Western Pacific deployment, comprised two Type 055 destroyers, one Type 052D destroyer, one Type 054A frigate, and a replenishment ship.
While the PLA officially frames the deployment as routine, it is not taking place in a vacuum. A more plausible near-term scenario is that the Liaoning will link up with the Shandong carrier group in the South China Sea, potentially as early preparation for dual-carrier or tri-carrier blue-water exercises later in 2025.
In October 2024, the PLAN operated two strike groups simultaneously in the South China Sea for the first time, deploying the Liaoning and Shandong together with at least 11 escorts and conducting J-15 flight operations from both carriers. The current deployment may be a precursor to repeating or exceeding that milestone.
According to the Pentagon’s 2025 China military report, Washington expects Beijing to field nine carrier strike groups by 2035, effectively tripling its current force and positioning the PLAN as a near-peer competitor to the U.S. Navy’s congressionally mandated eleven-carrier fleet.
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